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Abstract
We introduce and solve a new class of \downward-recursive" static portfolio
choice problems. An individual simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic
options, and each choice is costly. In the motivational application, just one may
be exercised from those that succeed. This often emerges in practice, such as when
a student applies to many colleges.
We show that a greedy algorithm ¯nds the optimal set. The optimal choices
are \less aggressive" than the sequentially optimal ones, but \more aggressive"
than the best singletons. The optimal set in general contains gaps. We provide a
comparative static on the chosen set.
¤The usage of the term `search' rather than `choice' here re°ects a precedent set in Weitzman (1979),
and in the directed search literature. We have bene¯ted from seminars at the 2003 Midwest Economic
Theory Meetings, ITAM, LBS, Penn, Duke, Michigan, Toronto Matching Conference, 2004 Society
for Economic Dynamics, 2004 North American Econometric Society Meetings, 2004 Latin American
Econometric Society Meetings, Yale, Texas, Stanford, and NYU. We are very grateful for research
assistance of Kan Takeuchi, and the feedback of Miles Kimball, Steve Salant, and Ennio Stacchetti.
Lones is grateful for the ¯nancial support of the National Science Foundation.
yEmail: hector.chade@asu.edu
zEmail: lones@umich.edu; web: www.umich.edu/»lones.1 Introduction
We introduce and solve a new class of \downward recursive" portfolio choice problems.
For instance, a decision maker (DM) simultaneously chooses among ranked stochastic
options, each choice is costly, and only the best realized alternative is exercised.
Our paper generalizes Stigler (1961), who analyzes optimal static wage search. Unlike
Stigler, we do not assume a priori identical prizes, and characterize both the optimal
sample size and choice composition. Weitzman (1979) also explores a problem with a
priori distinct prizes | but in the sequential world. His is a nice application of Gittins'
solution of the bandit problem. Each option can be assigned an index in isolation of all
others; sequentially, one simply chooses the unexplored option with the highest index.
In our problem, no such simple index rule presents itself. Instead, we ¯nd ourselves
faced with the maximization of a submodular function of sets of alternatives | to
be sure, a complex combinatorial optimization problem. Nevertheless, we show that an
economically natural algorithm produces the optimal set in a quadratic number of steps.
We then explore properties of the optimal set. We ask, for instance, how much risk
should one take. We show that the optimal portfolio is `more aggressive' than the set of
best options taken individually, but `less aggressive' than Weitzman's sequential choices.
We also ask how varied should the choices be. We argue in favor of an upwardly
diverse portfolio: For a rich enough array of possible options and low enough costs, a
connected `interval' of similarly-risky prospects is not optimal. We next provide a key
comparative static, showing how the choice set improves when acceptance chances rise,
and the acceptance chances of better alternatives rise proportionately more.
We believe that our problem is not without substantive practical value.
Example 1. A student must make a costly and simultaneously application to several
colleges, and is accepted with smaller chances by the better schools.
Example 2. A large ¯rm wishes to choose a technology; several are available, and
all are costly to explore; some will work out, and others will not. Finally, it is in a hurry
(e.g., it is in a race with other ¯rms), and must simultaneously choose which to explore.
Example 3. An economics department must °y out new PhD job candidates; the
°y-outs are costly. Each school ranks the candidates, and better ones are harder to hire.
Our paper may also be more topically viewed as a foundation for the recent literature
1on directed search (eg., allowing employees to choose which jobs to apply to). We solve
this decision problem for multiple applications and heterogeneous jobs.1
We ¯rst describe the problem. We introduce the algorithm and prove its optimality.
We then explore the properties of the optimal set: Does the DM insure herself or gamble?
Are the optimal choices similar, or disparate? What if success rates increase? The
appendix contains one more algebraic proof. We also refer the reader to the working
paper version Chade and Smith (2005) for additional results, examples, and discussion.
2 The Portfolio Problem
A decision maker (DM) can consume prizes from a ¯nite set N = f1;2;:::;Ng. Here, N
is a natural number, but abusing notation, we denote this set by N too, and its subsets
by 2N (with the subset inclusion order). Let f : 2N 7! R+ be a strictly increasing
function, with f(?) = 0. Interpret f(S) as the expected value of subset S, and put
zi ´ f(i) > 0.2 Prizes are random, and the prize set S has failure chance ½(S) 2 [0;1)
for all S 6= ? (and ½(?) = 1). Since ®i ´ 1 ¡ ½(i) is the success chance of prize i, the
ex post payo® is ui ´ f(i)=®i. We assume that prize 1 is ex post the best, 2 the next,
etc. so that u1 > u2 > ¢¢¢ > uN.
Say that U is above L, written U w L, if the worst prize in U beats the best in L.
We assume that the portfolio S is worth less than the sum of its parts. Speci¯cally, this
payo® function is downward recursive (DR), so that for all sets U w L in N:
f(U + L) = f(U) + ½(U)f(L) (1)
We observe that ½ is multiplicative in a DR payo® structure, since for all U w M w L:
f(U + M + L) = f(U + M) + ½(U + M)f(L) = [f(U) + ½(U)f(M)] + ½(U)½(M)f(L)
so that ½(U+M) = ½(U)½(M). Since ½ < 1, and is multiplicative, ½ is strictly decreasing.
The cost of a portfolio S is given by a function c(jSj), where S has cardinality jSj,
1See Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001) and Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (2002). Perhaps the ¯rst
equilibrium paper with multiple simultaneous searches is Burdett and Judd (1983).
2We avoid set notation, writing i=fig, A+B = A[B, A¡B = AnB, (i;j) = fk 2 Nji<k<jg, etc.
2c(0) = 0, and c is increasing and convex on R+. We assume zi > c(1) for all i, thereby
pruning weakly dominated prizes. This paper studies a one-shot maximization of v(S) =
f(S) ¡ c(jSj). Of course, v(?) = 0. Our analysis will frequently require consideration




and denote §¤ ´ §¤(N).
We also explore two prominent special cases of (2). By a ¯xed cost per application,
we mean that c(jSj) = ¹ cjSj, for some ¹ c > 0. In the ¯xed sample size n case, c(jSj) = 0
if jSj · n, and c(jSj) = 1 if jSj > n. Problem (2) becomes maxSµD&jSj=n f(S) with
solution §n(D). We then de¯ne §n ´ §n(N). Notice that §¤ = §n for some n.
3 Applications
A. The College Problem. A student must choose once and for all a portfolio S µ N
of colleges to apply for admission, at cost c(jSj). The best is 1, the second best 2, and so
on. The student's cardinal utility (ex post payo® ) from attending college i is ui, where
u1 > u2 > ¢¢¢ > uN. Her admission chance at college i is ®i 2 (0;1]. Intuitively one
might imagine the inverse ordering ®1 < ®2 < ¢¢¢ < ®N, but this is inessential, as we
shall see. The acceptance decisions by any set of colleges are independent. For instance,
this arises when colleges perceive noisy conditionally iid signals of a student's type, and
she fully knows her true type. The expected payo® of college i alone is zi = ®iui.
Working recursively, one either gets into the best college in S, or one does not; if
rejected, one either gets into the next best, or not, etc. Since ½(S) ´ ¦i2S(1¡®i) is the





`=1(1 ¡ ®(`)) =
PjSj
i=1 z(i)½(i¡1)(S) (3)
where (i) is the i-th best-ranked college in the set S, so that z(i) ´ ®(i)u(i), ½(i¡1)(S) =
Qi¡1
`=0(1 ¡ ®(`)) is the chance of being rejected by the top-ranked i ¡ 1 schools in set S.
This college structure contains the generality of the DR payo® structure of x2, and
we sometimes cast our results in the language of this application, for de¯niteness.
3B. Other Singleton Prize Models. The technology choice clearly has this structure.
Hiring at the economics department assumes this form after some reworking. Indeed,
assume that (i) °y-outs do not inform the hiring decision; (ii) each department needs at
most one job candidate; (iii) after the °y-out stage, the market clears top to bottom, so
that the better recruits are available with smaller chance to any school below the top.
C. Correlated Rejection Chances. Modify the college problem so that rejection
from school i scales down the acceptance chance at colleges j > i by a factor ¯i 2 [0;1].




l=1(1 ¡ ®(l))¯(l). This derives from a
consistent probability distribution over N for large enough ¯i (all i), and reduces to (2)
when ¯i ´ 1. Because of the DR structure, an equivalent college problem exists with
independent admission events: Assume acceptance rates ¹ ®i = 1¡(1¡®i)¯i and college
payo®s ¹ ui = ®iui=¹ ®i. The ex post payo®s ¹ ui fall in i also when the ¯i's are large enough.
D. One Shot Multi-Decisions for Dynamic Choice with Payo® Discounting.
The DM enjoys payo®s from all successful options, but can only consume one per period.
He thus eats the best ¯rst, etc. Future payo®s are discounted by the factor ± 2 [0;1). One





Here, an equivalent college problem requires ¹ ®i = (1 ¡ ±)®i and ¹ ui = ui=(1 ¡ ±).
4 The Solution
4.1 Consistency Checks on the Optimal Set
Computing the optimal set is a complex task, but we are able now to provide two useful
tests that it must obey. The DR equality (1) implies a key ordinal property, downward
maximization | optimizations on sets imply optimizations on lower ends of those sets:
Lemma 1 Let §n = U + L, where U w L and L has k elements. Then §k(D) = L
where D are those options in N not better ranked than the best in L.
If ex ante and ex post ranks of options agree, their marginal values are likewise ranked.
Lemma 2 Assume zi > zj and i < j. Then the marginal bene¯ts of i;j are ordered
MBi(S) ´ f(S + i) ¡ f(S) > f(S + j) ¡ f(S) = MBj(S) for any set S ½ N n fi;jg.
4Proof As i < j, we may write S = U +M +L, for sets (upper) U = [1;i)\S, (middle)
M = (i;j) \ S, and (lower) L = (j;N] \ S. So U w M w L. Consider the suboptimal
implementation policy for S+i: Accept the best available option, unless it is i, in which
case accept the best option in M (if available) over i. So by (1),
f(S + i) ¸ f(U) + ½(U)(f(M) + ½(M)[zi + (1 ¡ ®i)f(L)])
> f(U) + ½(U)(f(M) + ½(M)[zj + (1 ¡ ®j)f(L)]) = f(S + j)
since zi ¡ ®if(L) > zj ¡ ®jf(L), given zi = ®iui > ®juj = zj and ui > uj > f(L). ¤
If j 2 §n(N), then setting S = §n(N)¡j yields at once a simple insight into §¤. For
any chosen option, any better-ranked one with greater expected payo® is also chosen:
Lemma 3 Assume zi > zj and i < j. If j 2 §n(N), then i 2 §n(N).
4.2 An Optimal Marginal Improvement Algorithm
A \greedy algorithm" at each step makes the locally optimal choice, with the hope of
¯nding the global optimum. The next greedy algorithm, which we call the Marginal
Improvement Algorithm (MIA), identi¯es §¤ via an inductive procedure. Let ¨0=?.
Step 1 Choose any in 2 argmaxi2Nn¨n¡1 f(¨n¡1 + i).
Step 2 If f(¨n¡1 + in) ¡ f(¨n¡1) < c(n) ¡ c(n ¡ 1), then stop
Step 3 Set ¨n = ¨n¡1 + in and go to Step 1.
So one ¯rst identi¯es the option i1 whose expected payo® zi is largest.3 At any stage n,
one ¯nds the option in a®ording the largest marginal bene¯t over the college set con-
structed so far. The algorithm stops if the net marginal bene¯t turns negative.
Theorem 1 The MIA identi¯es the optimal set §¤ for problem (2) with D = N.
3The proof actually ignores the non-generic possibility of tied values of multiple argmax. With tied
values, there exists a vanishing sequence of " payo®-perturbations that renders §n uniquely optimal
along the "-sequence. By the Theorem of the Maximum, this constant solution correspondence of the
"-perturbed problems gives the solution of the unperturbed limit problem. So the choice §n is optimal.
5Standard combinatorial optimization proofs proceed by policy improvement. Our
proof by induction below is mostly di®erent, exploiting two properties of DR functions.
We have the ordinal property of §n(D) in Lemma 1, and the following cardinal property.
Let ¨n(D) be the n options chosen by the MIA from domain D ½ N. In set D, let
us call the best option \0". Let options i;j2N ¡ D be lower ranked than 0. Then:
f(D + i)¡f(D + j) = ½(0)[f(D ¡ 0 + i)¡f(D ¡ 0 + j)] (4)
Thus, if the marginal bene¯t of i exceeds j given D¡0, then it does so given D. So:
Lemma 4 We have j¨n(D¡0)\¨n(D)j ¸ n¡1 and j¨n¡1(D¡0)\¨n(D)j = n¡1.
Proof: To see both claims, observe that if 0 = 2 ¨n(D), then ¨n(D) = ¨n(D ¡ 0) ¾
¨n¡1(D ¡ 0). But if 0 2 ¨n(D), then ¨n(D) = 0 + ¨n¡1(D ¡ 0) by equation (4). ¤
To show §n(D) = ¨n(D), we ¯nd (a) downward maximization (Lemma 1) links
§n(D) and §n¡1(D), and §n(D) and §n(D ¡ 0); (b) the marginal bene¯t property
(Lemma 4) and the MIA links ¨n(D) and ¨n¡1(D), and ¨n(D) and ¨n(D¡0); and (c)
§n¡1(D)=¨n¡1(D) and §n(D ¡ 0)=¨n(D ¡ 0), by induction assumption.
Proof of Theorem 1: We ¯rst show that ¨n(D) = §n(D) if D µ N and n · jDj. Trivial
for jDj=1. Assume it for ^ D · D, ^ n · n, not both with equality. If i = 2 ¨n(D)[§n(D),
then §n(D)=§n(D¡i)=¨n(D¡i)=¨n(D), by induction. So let ¨n(D)[§n(D)=D.
Case 1: 0 2 §n(D). By Lemma 1, §n(D) = 0+§n¡1(D¡0). So 0 yields the greatest
marginal improvement to §n¡1(D ¡0) = ¨n¡1(D ¡0), by the induction assumption. If
0 = 2 ¨n¡1(D), then ¨n¡1(D ¡0) = ¨n¡1(D), and so ¨n(D) = 0+¨n¡1(D) = §n(D). If
0 2 ¨n¡1(D) ½ ¨n(D), then Lemma 4 yields ¨n(D) = 0 + ¨n¡1(D ¡ 0) = §n(D).
Case 2: 0 = 2 §n(D). By induction and the premise, ¨n(D ¡ 0) = §n(D ¡ 0) =
§n(D). Also, ¨n(D) and ¨n(D ¡ 0) overlap on n ¡ 1 or n schools by Lemma 4. Since
¨n(D) [ §n(D)=D, we have §n(D)=D ¡ 0 and ¨n(D)=D ¡ k, for some k. Assume
k 6= 0, or we are done. Thus, §n¡1(D)=¨n¡1(D)=D ¡ j ¡ k for some j 6= k, by the
induction assumption and the MIA. If j=0, then the best addition to ¨n¡1(D)=D¡0¡k
is 0, and so §n(D)=D ¡ k. Contradiction. Assume j 6= 0, and wlog let j < k. Write
D = U + L, where U = D \ [1;k] and L = U ¡D. So U w L. If ®0 > ®j then easily
6z0>zj, and so f(D ¡ j)>f(D ¡ 0) by Lemma 2. Hence, §n(D)=D ¡ 0 is suboptimal,
a contradiction. And when ®0 < ®j:
f(D ¡ j) = f(U ¡ j ¡ k) + ½(U ¡ j ¡ k)[f(k) + ½(k)f(L)]
= f(D ¡ j ¡ k) + ½(U ¡ j ¡ k)[f(k) ¡ (1 ¡ ½(k))f(L)] (5)
exceeds f(D¡0¡k)+½(U¡0¡k)[f(k)¡(1¡½(k))f(L)] = f(D¡0), given (a) f(D¡j¡k) >
f(D¡0¡k), and (b) ½(U ¡j¡k) > ½(U ¡0¡k), and (c) f(k)=(1 ¡ ½(k)) = uk > f(L).
As the cost of a portfolio depends only on its size, §¤(N) = §n(N) for some n. The
stopping rule is optimal since the cost c(n) is convex in n and because f has diminishing
returns | f(S + k) ¡ f(S) is decreasing in S for any k = 2Sµ N | as we see below. ¤
To see diminishing returns, let us introduce the marginal bene¯t of adding college k
to a set S. Partition S = Uk +Lk, where Uk = [1;k)\S and Lk = (k;N]\S. Then (5)
yields:
MBk(S) = f(S + k) ¡ f(S) = ½(Uk)[zk ¡ ®kf(Lk)] (6)
Because uk > f(Lk), and ½ is decreasing and f increasing, we have:
Lemma 5 Any DR function f : 2N 7! R has diminishing returns.
Intuitively, additions to the current portfolio grow less valuable as more options are added.
Note that v(S + i) ¡ v(S) < v(i) ¡ v(?) = zi ¡ c(1), whenever S 6= ?, by Lemma 5. So
choosing all options with zi > c(1) yields a suboptimally large portfolio.
4.3 Submodular Optimization
As noted, the value of a portfolio is less than the sum of its parts, since each option exerts
a negative externality on the others. To cleanly capture this notion, call a function f on
2N submodular if f(S \T)+f(S [T) · f(S)+f(T) for any two subsets S and T of N.
Lemma 6 Any DR function f is submodular, and thus so is v : 2N 7! R in (2).
Proof First, f is submodular as it has diminishing returns.4 Next, ¡c(jSj) is a concave
function, and so a submodular function (Proposition 5.1 in Lov¶ asz (1982) p.251).5 ¤
4See Proposition 1.1 in Lov¶ asz (1982). Gul and Stacchetti (1999) recently used this property in the
economics literature. See related work by Kelso and Crawford (1982) on the gross substitutes condition.
5Observe that a sum of submodular functions, like f + (¡c), is submodular.
7It is well-known that the maximization of a general submodular set function is NP-
hard and thus computationally intractable. Indeed, no polynomial algorithm exists for
it (this is independent of the P6= NP problem; see Lov¶ asz (1982), p. 252). By exploiting
the special functional form of our objective function v, the MIA quickly ¯nds the optimal
set §¤ for all DR submodular functions. One must in principle calculate the values of all
2N college application patterns. Yet our algorithm succeeds in polynomial time: Initially,
one examines N options and ¯nds the best one. One then examines the next N ¡1 and
¯nds the second best, etc. This amounts to
PN¡1
i=0 (N ¡i) = N(N +1)=2 = O(N2) steps.
Let us step back and ask whether the MIA's success pre-destined, in light of the
recent theory of combinatorial optimization. One can show that f(S) is (what is known
as) semi-strictly quasi-concave.6 As with standard quasiconcavity, local then implies
global optimization. It does not, however, imply that a `steepest ascent' algorithm like
the MIA will succeed, as we prove it does for the class of DR payo® functions.7
5 Properties of the Optimal Set
5.1 Aggressiveness of the Optimal Choices
How \risk-taking" should the portfolio be? To °esh this out, we employ vector ¯rst order
stochastic dominance (FSD). The set S µ N is more aggressive than the same-size set
S0 µ N in the sense of FSD when si · s0
i for all i, where si is the ith best school in S
and s0
i in S0. Write this as S º S0, and as S Â S0 if also S 6= S0. Thus, f1;2g Â f2;3g.
We now compare the best set §¤ against two easily computed benchmarks.
A. Portfolio Choices are more Aggressive than Top Singletons. Consider the
set Zj§¤j µ N of options with the j§¤j highest expected payo®s zi = ®iui. Unlike the
portfolio §¤, this set ignores the web of cross college external e®ects, as captured by (3).
Theorem 2 The best portfolio §¤ is more aggressive than the best singletons Zj§¤j.
6See Murota and Shioura (2003). More precisely, f(S) only satis¯es a weak notion of semi-strictly
quasi M\-concavity, given by property (SSQMw) on p. 472. See Chade and Smith (2005).
7In Chade and Smith (2005), we show that the MIA works for some non-DR functions too.
8Proof It su±ces to show that if i < j and zi > zj, then MIA picks i before j. By
Lemma 2, for any portfolio S excluding i;j, we have MBi(S) > MBj(S). ¤
For an intuition, consider expression (3) for expected payo®s, i.e.
P
i z(i)½i¡1(S). If
options in §¤ do not have the highest zi's, then they must compensate with a higher
½i¡1(S). So acceptance chances are lower, and these options must be better ranked.
To see that the order can be strict, assume three colleges, with ®1 = 0:1, ®2 = 0:9,
®3 = 1, u1 = 1, u2 = 0:5, u3 = 0:48. Notice that z3 = 0:48 > z2 = 0:45 > z1 = 0:1. One
can show that §2(3) = f1;3g which is strictly more aggressive than Z2 = f2;3g.
Static portfolio maximization thus precludes `safety schools.' One never applies to a
school for its high admissions rate, when not otherwise justi¯ed by its expected payo®.
But one might apply to a high-ranked `stretch school,' despite the low expected payo®.
The `no safety school' substance of Theorem 2 is undermined with arbitrary correla-
tion (not of the form in x3-C). For an extreme example with perfect correlation, assume
three colleges, with payo®s u1 = 1, u2 = u < 1, ®1 = ®2 = ®, u3 = v < u, ®3 = ®0 > ®,
and ®u > ®0v. Suppose the student is either accepted in both 1 and 2 (chance ®), or
rejected in both. Exhaustive checking reveals that §2(2) = f1;3g, while Z2 = f1;2g.
B. Portfolio Choices are Less Aggressive than Sequential Choices. Consider
the case where a student can apply to the colleges sequentially, observing whether one
accepts her before she applies to the next. For a fair comparison, let us restrict to
constant marginal costs c(jSj)=¹ cjSj, ¹ c>0. The optimal policy in Weitzman (1979) is
derived as follows. To each college i, associate an intrinsic index or reservation value
Ii; this leaves the student indi®erent between a ¯nal payo® Ii, and ¯rst applying to
college i and then earning payo® Ii if rejected. Then Ii = zi ¡ ¹ c + (1 ¡ ®i)Ii, and thus
Ii = (zi ¡ ¹ c)=®i = ui ¡ ¹ c=®i. The optimal policy orders the colleges by their indices Ii;
the student proceeds down the list, stopping when one accepts him (since ui > Ii).
The solution of our static problem substantially di®ers from the sequential approach.
For instance, we have shown that one must apply to the college with the largest expected
payo® zi. Easily, this needn't coincide with the one having the highest Gittins index Ii.
In general, the sequential decision-maker employs a more aggressive strategy than
does our portfolio one. Let W be the list of colleges for which it is sequentially optimal
to search, given continued failure, and Wj§¤j the set with the j§¤j highest indices Ii.
9Theorem 3 The best portfolio §¤ is not larger than W, and less aggressive than Wj§¤j.
Proof For the size comparison, consider that the sequential rule continues as long as
Ii ¸ 0, or zi ¸ ¹ c. The static decision-maker, by contrast, stops when the marginal value
of the last college i | which is at most zi¡¹ c, due to the externalities | turns negative.
We now show that Wj§¤j º §¤. It su±ces to show that if i < j, and S is any portfolio
for which MIA picks i over j, then the Gittins indices are likewise ranked Ii > Ij. This
is obvious if ®i > ®j, for then Ii = ui ¡ ¹ c=®i > uj ¡ ¹ c=®j = Ij. Otherwise, using the
marginal bene¯t expression MBk(S) = ½(Uk)[zk ¡ ®kf(Lk)] > 0 from (6), we ¯nd that:
Ii ¡ Ij =
zi ¡ ¹ c
®i
¡


















+ [f(Li) ¡ f(Lj)]
If MBi(S)¸MBj(S), then Ii>Ij as: ½(Ui)<½(Uj), ®i<®j, and f(Li) > f(Lj). ¤
To see that the order can be strict, assume three colleges, again with ®1 = 0:1,
®2 = 0:9, ®3 = 1, u1 = 1, u2 = 0:5, u3 = 0:48, but now ¹ c = 0:05. One can show that
Wj§¤j = f1;2g, which is strictly more aggressive than §¤ = f1;3g.
5.2 Portfolio Choice Sets are Upwardly Diverse
We turn to another key characteristic of the statically optimal set. How similar should
be the chosen options? Is the optimal set an \interval", say [i;j]?
Assume ¯rst z1 > z2 > ¢¢¢ > zn. It follows from Theorem 2 that they should just
apply to an interval of top schools. Indeed, §¤ºZj§¤j=[1;j§¤j] implies §¤ = [1;j§¤j].
Apart from this case, a force to gamble upwards emerges and the optimal portfolio is
not in general an interval. To see this, consider a stylized world with constant marginal
cost ¹ c > 0, one college i, and N ¡ 1 copies of college j > i, with zj > zi. The algorithm
starts with j. We claim that for N large enough and ¹ c small enough, the algorithm
chooses college i before exhausting college j copies. Indeed, suppose the algorithm has
chosen n ¡ 1 copies of college j, but not yet college i. The marginal bene¯t of choosing
another college j copy is (1¡®j)n¡1®juj¡¹ c. While this vanishes geometrically fast in n,
the marginal bene¯t of choosing college i, namely ®iui¡®iuj(1¡(1¡®j)n¡1)¡¹ c, tends
to ®i(ui ¡uj)¡ ¹ c. For small ¹ c, this is positive. Thus, for large n, it is optimal to choose
i over another copy of j. By continuity, this result obviously holds even when all copies
10of j are not literally identical and there is a su±ciently dense and diverse collection of
colleges. So for low enough application costs, one always has an incentive to gamble
upward, and apply to a discretely higher college than the rest.
5.3 Comparative Statics
We ¯nally consider some natural comparative statics. Obviously, with greater costs c(¢),
the size of §¤ decreases, for the algorithm stops sooner.
More interestingly, how will choices change when acceptance chances (®1;:::;®N)
change? The answer is far from obvious, for the submodular character of f precludes
any direct application of the monotone comparative statics results (see Topkis (1998)).
Theorem 4 Assume ¯ = (¯1;:::;¯N) is higher than ® and proportionately favors better
options more than ®. Namely, ¯i ¸ ®i for all i and ¯i=®i > ¯i+1=®i+1, for all i < N.
(a) The best n-portfolio §¯





i = ®iui and z
¯
i = ¯iui, for all i, and let z®
1 > ¢¢¢ > z®
N and z
¯
1 > ¢¢¢ > z
¯
N. The
optimal sets are thus [1;n®] and [1;n¯]. If also (1 ¡ ®1)®2 > (1 ¡ ¯1)¯2, then n¯ · n®.
Proof of (a): The proof is another double induction on n and N. Let §®
n(N) be the
optimal n-choice set from N for acceptance chances ®. The result holds for n = 1 and
all N, by the MIA. Otherwise, if j = argmaxi ¯iui > argmaxi ®iui = k, then ¯juj¸¯kuk
and ®kuk¸®juj imply ¯j=¯k¸uk=uj¸®j=®k, contrary to our premise.
Assume the result holds for all ^ n · n and ^ N · N, with one inequality strict. If some
j = 2 §®
n(N) [ §¯
n(N), then the result holds by induction on the domain N ¡ j. Assume
there are no omitted options j. Thus, 1 2 §®
n(N)[§¯





n(N) = 1 + §
¯
n(N ¡ 1) º 1 + §
®
n(N ¡ 1) = §
®
n(N)
by Lemma 1. If 1 = 2 §®
n(N), pick the least k = 2 §¯
n(N). Putting M = [2;k ¡ 1], we have
§
¯
n(N) = 1 + M + L




where L® = §®
n(N) \ [k;N] and L¯ ´ §¯
n(N) \ [k;N], by Lemma 1. Since jL®j = jL¯j,
we have L¯ º L® by the induction assumption. If 1 = 2 §¯




n(N) = 1 + M + L
® and §
¯
n(N) = M + k + L
¯
where L¯ º L®. The appendix proves f¯(1+M+L¯)>f¯(§¯
n(N)), contradicting §¯(N)
optimal. This case cannot therefore arise. ¤
6 Conclusion
Static optimization is rapidly becoming yesterday's struggle in economics. In this paper,
we have identi¯ed a common and yet unsolved class of downward recursive static portfolio
choice problems, such as where one earns only the best prize from a portfolio. Such
portfolio choices are intriguing, insofar as the value of a portfolio is subtly less than the
sum of its parts. Such problems are also practically important, being faced by millions
of college applicants, thousands of employers competing to hire in student-driven job
markets, as well as ¯rms choosing among uncertain technologies to explore.
We have shown that a greedy algorithm ¯nds the optimal portfolio, and have iden-
ti¯ed the key properties that account for its success. This de¯nes a useful class of
submodular functions that can be e±ciently maximized. We have also provided some
interesting properties that the optimal set possesses.
Chade and Smith (2005) proves that the MIA also works with non-DR functions
on a richer set of prizes that satisfy a `second order stochastic dominance' condition.
Examples of the failure of the MIA are given, such as with di®erent option costs, or
general binary prizes. It is an exciting open problem to ¯nd an algorithm that works
e±ciently in these cases: future research beckons.
12A Appendix: Proof of Theorem 4 Finished
Part (a). We need f¯(1+M+L¯) > f¯(§¯
n(N)). If ®1 > ®k then z1 > zk, and the claim
follows from Lemma 2. Assume hereafter ®1 < ®k. Then f®(§®
n(N)) ¸ f®(M +k+L®),
since §®
n(N) is optimal for f®. Hence,






®(M)[®kuk + (1 ¡ ®k)f
®(L
®)]:















®) ¸ uk: (7)
We now argue that replacing ® by ¯ yields a strict inequality in (7), which is likewise
equivalent to f¯(1 + M + L¯) > f¯(§¯
n(N)). We now justify this assertion:
² Since 1 dominates every option in M +L® and M +L¯, we have u1 > f®(M +L®)











² Since ¯1=¯k > ®1=®k, the weight on the ¯rst term of (7) strictly increases.
² f¯(L¯) ¸ f¯(L®) > f®(L®), respectively by Lemma 1, and because ¯i ¸ ®i, for
all i, and ¯i > ®i for some i (since the ratio ordering ¯i=®i > ¯i+1=®i+1 is strict)














To see this, write f®(M) = f®(U) + ½®(U)[®`u` + (1 ¡ ®`)f®(L)] using (1), where
L = (`;N] \ M and U = [1;`) \ M. Thus,
u1 ¡ f®(M) = u1 ¡ (f®(U) + ½®(U)[®`u` + (1 ¡ ®`)f®(L)])
= [u1 ¡ f®(U) ¡ ½®(U)f®(L)] ¡ ½®(U)[u` ¡ f®(L)]®`
= A ¡ B®`




½®(M ¡ `)(1 ¡ ®`)
=
A ¡ B
½®(M ¡ `)(1 ¡ ®`)2
since ½®(M) = ½®(M ¡ `)(1 ¡ ®`). But this is positive given





®(L)] = u1 ¡ f
®(U) ¡ ½
®(U)u` > 0
because option 1 dominates options in [1;`] \ M, so that u1 > f(U + `).
Part (b). Parameterize µ = ®;¯, where ® = µL;¯ = µH. When zµ
1 > zµ
2 > ¢¢¢ > zµ
N, the
restriction to C = fS µ NjS = [1;n];n · Ng is wlog. So consider maxSµC v(S;µ).
Since C is a chain (i.e. a totally-ordered set), v(S;µ) is quasi-supermodular in S.
Thus, to show that the maximizer is increasing in µ, we need to show that the single





























Algebra reveals that this holds if ¯2(1 ¡ ¯1) · ®2(1 ¡ ®1) and ¯i=®i > ¯i+1=®i+1. ¤
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